INTRODUCTION: THE REDISCOVERY OF THE BODY AND OF THE WORLD.
Cognitive Science is in some sense the science of the mind. But an increasingly influential theme, in recent years, has been the role of the physical body, and of the local environment, in promoting adaptive success. No right-minded Cognitive Scientist, to be sure, ever claimed that body and world were completely irrelevant to the understanding of mind. But there was, nonetheless, an unmistakable tendency to marginalize such factors: to dwell on inner complexity whilst simplifying or ignoring the complex inner-outer interplays that characterize the bulk of basic biological problemsolving 1 . This tendency was expressed in, for example, the development of planning algorithms that treated real-world action as merely a way of implementing solutions arrived at by pure cognition (more recent work, by contrast, allows such actions to play important computational and problem-solving roles 2 ). It was also expressed in David Marr's 3 depiction of the task of vision as the construction of a detailed threedimensional image of the visual scene. For possession of such a rich inner model effectively allows the system to "throw away" the world and to focus current computational activity int he inner model alone 4 . More generally, the whole vision of cognition as inner operations on internal world models reflects an explanatory strategy which might reasonably be dubbed isolationism 5 :
(Isolationism)
The world is (just) a source of inputs and an arena for outputs. And the body is just an organ for receiving inputs and effecting outputs (actions). The task of early processing is to render the inputs as an inner world-model of sufficient (1991) . The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) explicitly acknowledge MerleauPonty. There is a brief discussion of these historical root in Clark (1997) thickness to allow the bulk of problem-solving activity to be defined over the inner model alone.
Isolationism, it is fair to say, is in increasing disrepute. But the precise shape of an alternative paradigm remains unclear. Anti-isolationist assertions range from the relatively innocent insistence that we won't achieve a balanced vision of what the brain does until we pay more heed to the complex roles of body and world, to the selfconsciously revolutionary accusation that mind itself is not, after all, a special realm populated by internal models and representations so much as an inextricable interwoven system, incorporating element of brain, body and world --a system which resists informative analysis in terms of the old notions of model, representation and computation 6 . The most radical anti-isolationist vision thus depicts human beings as a species of (so-called) post-Cartesian agent 7 . The post-Cartesian agent is a locus of 4 knowledge, acts for reasons and has beliefs and desires. Yet she harbors no internal representations and resists analysis in terms of any cognitively important distinctions between "inner" and "outer" processes, between perception, cognition & action, or between mind, body, and world.
I shall argue that the post-Cartesian vision is unconvincing and that a key move in the argument (a move I dub the "Cognitive-to-Coping Shift") is both dialectically suspect and empirically unsound. More positively, I shall suggest that a weaker antiisolationist stance still requires some deep revisions in our understanding of the inner vehicles, the contents and the adaptive roles of internal representation and inner world models. The foundational and conceptual challenges are real enough, even when stripped of their radical post-Cartesian trimmings.
INNER SYMBOL FLIGHT.
The outright rejection of the notion of internal representation is usefully seen as the extreme limiting case of a (generally admirable) process of inner symbol flight. This process involves the progressive rejection of more and more of the apparatus and assumptions associated with the vision of cognition as the manipulation of chunky inner symbols. According to this simple (and historically important) vision, semantically sensible transitions between mental states are explained in terms of syntactically constrained transitions between inner symbol strings. These symbol strings contained discrete elements corresponding rather closely to the semantic elements identified in 1).
The use of task-specific cues and shortcues.
2). The use of body-centered (egocentric) strategies.
3). The use of repeated environmental interactions. of a visual scene retrieving specific information only as and when required.
The case of deictic pointers merits a longer look. A pointer in classical Artificial
Intelligence, is an inner state that can function in self-contained computational routines but which can also "point to" other data structures 16 . This pointing allows the retrieval, when required, of more detailed information, and the effective binding of certain items of information to others. Such binding can be temporary, as when we bind certain features (e.g., bright yellow) to certain current visual locations (top left of visual field).
Deictic pointers, however, are not inner markers but actual bodily orientations (such as saccadic eye movements) that play the same kind of particular aspect of a visual scene, we may both retrieve more detailed information and achieve a kind of temporary variable binding in which we associate the detected features with a given spatial location. A further example is the binding of a reaching-and-grasping routine to a target object using what is informally called a "do-it-where-I'm-looking" strategy.
Here, the system is set up so that the grasping motion is directed to the fixated visual location. In all these cases:
16 See e.g., Pylyshyn, Z. The general thrust of the Animate vision research, then, is that bodily actions (such as saccadic eye motions) play vital computational roles, and that repeated agent-environment interactions obviate much of the need to create all-purpose, detailed internal world models. Instead, we visit and re-visit different aspects of the scene as and when required, allowing the world to function as "its own best model".
The research program is this staunchly anti-isolationist. But it is not by any means
'post-Cartesian' --it does not reject the ideas of internal models and representations, so much as reconfigure them in sparse and more interactive image. We thus read of 'inner databases' that associate objects (e.g., my car keys) and locations (on the kitchen table), of 'internal featured representations', 'indexical representations', and so on. What is being rejected is this not the notion of inner content-bearing states per se, but rather the much stronger notion of rich, memory-intensive, all-purpose forms of internal representation.
A similar conclusion is suggested by work 17 in real-world robotic navigation, in which, knowledge of location is encoded as a perceptio-motor routine that will actually 17 Mataric (1991). This work is further discussed in Clark (1997), Chapter 2.
move the robot from its present position to the desired spot. In this way, the inner map is itself the controller of the appropriate action. There is no need for a further system to access the 'map' and to plan a route. Instead, the knowledge is at once both descriptive and prescriptive 18 --a dual nature that affords great economies both in terms of response-time and computational effort.
The crucial distinction, it seems to me, is thus not between representational and non-representational solutions so much as between action-neutral forms of internal representation (which may increase flexibility but require additional computational work to specify a behavioral response) and action-oriented forms (which build the response into the representation itself). For what is at issue is not the status of certain systems (ourselves, for example) as representers. That is a given. We surely do represent our world, our past, our possible futures, our absent friends and so on. We think of these things and states of affairs and thus represent them to ourselves. What is not a given (and what is at issue here)
is that we use internal representations to do so. The point (and I think it is a good one)
is that the notion that cognition involves internal representations (and computations defined over them) is meant to be not a simple rehearsal of the fact that we are thinkers, but a substantial and explanatorily potent empirical hypothesis: the kind of thing that could indeed turn out to be false. The claim, to a first approximation, is that there are distinct, identifiable inner resources whose systemic or functional role is to stand in for specific features or states of affairs. This problem of requiring feedback before it is practically available, crops up in industry too: in chemical plants, bioreactors and so forth 35 . One common solution, in these cases, is to add a 'forward model' or 'emulator' into the systems. This is a circuit that takes as input a specification of both the previous state of the system and the commands just issued, and that gives as output a prediction of the feedback that should later arrive. The emulator thus generates a kind of mock feedback signal available substantially in advance of the real thing.
Nature, it now seems, may deploy much of the same strategy. There is a fair body of neuroscientific evidence 36 that suggests that neural circuitry spanning the cortico-spinal tract, the red nucleus, the inferior drive, the contralateral debate and cerebellar cortex may be playing just such a role. Such circuitry looks to take a copy of the afferent motor command and to output a fast prediction of the feedback later due arrive by the slow 200-500 millisecond route.
The same trick has been replicated in a variety of neural network 37 models. What matters for our purposes, however, is an additional conjecture. It is the conjecture Given such a profile, we can see why isolationist methodologies and assumptions are inadequate even in the case of certain kinds of environmentally decoupled cognitive skills. For such skills may remain action-oriented at one x with 23 both contents and mechanisms being profoundly informal by the agents real-time interactive purposes. Once again, however, the failure of isolationism should not be seen as an invitation to scepticism about representation and inner models. In the emulator case, it is clearly apparent that we are dealing with identifiable circuitry whose functional role is to model specific aspects of extra-neural (in this case bodily)
reality. Yet this inner modeling is of a type that is perfectly continuous with the various morals and emphasizes suggested by the action-oriented research discussed earlier.
The conciliatory position that I favor this involves combining the stress on real-world, real-time action with a search for the biologically basic roots of more decoupled forms of thought and problem-solving. It is only by confronting the latter class of cases that representationalism can be given a fair trial.
SCALING, RATIONALITY AND COMPLEXITY.
Minimal only do so if we take the issue of external scaffolding very seriously and recognize the special virtues of public language: the one action-neutral symbolic code we know ourselves and possess. One implication of this approach to the scaling problem is that we will need, at times, to study these larger systems (of multiple communicating brains and artifacts) as organized wholes and to recognize extended computational processes spanning the boundaries between brain, body and world. Such assertions can easily be mistaken for antipathy towards the study of the inner resources and processes. But the real challenge, once again, is to interlock the two approaches and impossible. The point is just that the space of internal representational vehicles may be much larger than the space of persisting inner states.
